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Introduction 
 
 
Regional Security and Cooperation in the 
Arctic and Baltic 
Destabilisation Follows Ukraine Crisis 
Tobias Etzold and Stefan Steinicke 
The Ukraine conflict has created a deep and long-running crisis of confidence in rela-
tions between the West and Russia, as Moscow challenges the foundations of the Euro-
pean security order. Russia’s behaviour in the Baltic and Arctic regions, which it shares 
with members of NATO and the European Union, has become increasingly confronta-
tive and presents an impediment to regional cooperation and security. While growing 
instability looms over these two regions, all the states there should maintain at least 
low-level regional cooperation with Russia, in order to prevent any further escalation 
of security tensions and at least partially restore trust. 
 
For a long time, Russia and members of 
NATO and the European Union have co-
operated effectively and as equals in both 
the Baltic and the Arctic. It is, however, 
becoming apparent that regional coopera-
tion cannot exist in isolation from and un-
influenced by the broader political situation. 
In the early 1990s, following the end of 
the Cold War, the Baltic Council, other 
Baltic institutions and the Arctic Council 
were founded as regional forums for co-
operation between the states of the former 
Eastern and Western blocs. Their estab-
lishment served as a confidence-building 
measure. Questions of military security 
were deliberately left aside; mutual trust 
was to be built above all through coopera-
tion in the areas of research, environment, 
business and culture. 
Today the regional orders in the Baltic 
and Arctic are facing similar fundamental 
challenges, great enough to call into ques-
tion the existing modus operandi. Firstly, 
the crisis between the West and Russia has 
interrupted the process of institutional re-
newal initiated at the end of the 2000s and 
the recently energised political dialogue in 
the scope of Baltic Sea cooperation; long 
overdue steps to reform the Arctic Council 
are on hold. All involved see a grave danger 
of disagreements further deepening the rift. 
Secondly, the militarisation of both 
regions proceeds apace, as witnessed by 
military expansion, aerial manoeuvres and 
large-scale military exercises. Each side 
justifies its demonstrations of power as a 
response to the other’s military build-up 
and the ensuing threat. Because trust has 
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been lost and regional institutional frame-
works for dealing with security issues are 
lacking, the regional arms race is liable to 
continue. And this threatens to create a 
security dilemma. Individual military inci-
dents already contain the potential for loss 
of control and unintentional escalation. 
Repercussions for Cooperation 
This increasing militarisation is a bitter 
experience for the regional actors, given 
that the Baltic and Arctic had been regard-
ed as peaceful, inclusive and constructive – 
as models for resolving conflicts through 
political dialogue. 
One important goal of all cooperation 
efforts in the Baltic Sea region since the 
early 1990s has been to include Russia as an 
equal. Despite frequent difficulties, Russia 
has been consistently and successfully inte-
grated in regional initiatives. But currently 
there is precious little in the way of multi-
lateral political dialogue with Russia. After 
the cancellation of the Baltic Sea States 
Summit of heads of government planned 
for June 2014 in Turku, Finland, the June 
2015 meeting of Council of the Baltic Sea 
States foreign ministers was also called off 
and replaced with technical meetings at the 
level of officials. Instead the EU member 
states in the region are working more close-
ly together, especially in the context of the 
EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. The 
added value of political dialogue with Rus-
sia, which is presently scarcely visible, 
needs to be redefined and developed for 
all participants. 
Although the crisis means that business 
as usual is out of the question, Germany 
in particular argues for low-level regional 
cooperation with Russia to be maintained 
wherever possible and necessary. This is 
still largely functioning in the environmen-
tally orientated Helsinki Commission 
(HELCOM), and in the Northern Dimension 
(ND), where the European Union, Russia, 
Norway and Iceland are partners. Both con-
tinue to bring together senior officials from 
Russia and the European Commission; 
projects are continuing. 
Whereas the Arctic played a central role 
in the nuclear strategies of East and West 
during the Cold War, from the 1990s trans-
national concerns such as research and 
environment moved to the fore. The found-
ing of the Arctic Council (AR) in 1996 insti-
tutionalised and consolidated cooperation 
between the regional actors. But today the 
everyday work of the Arctic Council has 
become increasingly difficult. Certain mem-
ber states boycotted a task force meeting 
on environmental questions in Moscow, 
while this year’s ministerial meeting in 
Iqaluit, Canada, was attended only by Rus-
sia’s environment minister rather than 
foreign minister. Talks on strategic ideas 
for institutional development of the Arctic 
Council have been postponed. As recently 
as 2013 in Kiruna, the Arctic Council had 
declared the goal of strengthening its role 
as the central governance forum in the 
region. By accepting six more countries as 
observers, primarily from Asia, the Council 
underlined its political ambition to shape 
regional processes and their interaction 
with climate change and globalisation. As 
confidence between the West and Russia 
has deteriorated and demonstrations of 
military strength intensified, fundamental 
political topics have been shunted to the 
background. The focus of the Arctic Council 
is presently exclusively on technical ques-
tions, in order to avoid any kind of political 
dispute that could cost yet more trust. 
Decisions about important but controver-
sial matters such as acceptance of the 
European Union as a permanent observer 
are currently off the agenda. The European 
Union is pushing for this status in order 
to gain more direct access to the Council’s 
work. The renewed postponement of a 
decision about observer status threatens to 
leave the Union out in the cold – vis-à-vis 
the Asian observer states – on the question 
of positioning in the Arctic. Although it is 
positive that the Arctic Council continues 
to meet and the activities of the working 
groups continue, political paralysis threat-
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ens in the longer term if fundamental 
strategic – and also controversial – issues 
are not successfully addressed. Regional 
issues like climate change and environmen-
tal protection or economic development, 
which are also significant for the European 
Union and can only be tackled jointly, 
would fall by the wayside. The longer the 
new East-West conflict continues, the harder 
political cooperation will be and the more 
irrelevant the Council will become. 
Security Dilemma Looms 
Increasing military activity by all sides 
could create a security dilemma. Russian 
military provocations and violations of 
national airspace and territorial waters in 
the Arctic and Baltic are on the rise. In 
2014 seventy-four Russian warplanes were 
intercepted off the Norwegian coast, a 27 
percent increase over the previous year. In 
the Baltic Sea region, NATO’s air policing 
mission has seen a fourfold increase in 
interceptions of Russian military jets in 
more than 150 deployments. Since 2014 
there have been several near-collisions 
between Russian warplanes and NATO or 
civilian aircraft. In March 2015 Russian 
forces practised the invasion of northern 
Norway and Danish, Finnish and Swedish 
Baltic islands, and the same month a gener-
al mobilisation of all Russian forces in the 
Arctic was declared at very short notice. 
In its Far North Russia is reinforcing its 
military infrastructure by resurrecting 
Soviet airstrips, expanding existing bases 
and deploying anti-aircraft missiles and 
radar systems. The Arctic is again coming 
to the fore as a springboard for Moscow’s 
global power projection. In November 2014 
Russia tested its complete nuclear triad in 
and from its Arctic regions. Russia’s expand-
ing military presence is a logical conse-
quence of the new military doctrine adopt-
ed at the end of 2014 (see SWP Comment 
9/2015), which for the first time defines the 
Arctic as part of Russia’s sphere of influ-
ence. 
Russia’s military build-up and its politi-
cal will to pursue national interests by 
military means are unsettling for the other 
states in the region. Growing uncertainty 
about Moscow’s intentions in these two 
regions is leading many Nordic and Baltic 
countries to boost their defence budgets. 
Norway alone added €500 million to its 
2015 defence budget in order to strengthen 
its capacities in the Arctic. 
In response to Russia’s aggressive rheto-
ric and activities along its external borders, 
NATO and EU states have wound down 
their security coordination and cooperation 
with Russia. Norway already suspended its 
bilateral military cooperation with Russia 
in 2014. On the other hand, bilateral and 
multilateral military cooperation and co-
ordination among NATO and EU states in 
the region is intensifying (see SWP Comments 
25/2015 and 40/2015). The Balts demand 
stronger NATO support and a larger troop 
presence in their countries. Sweden and 
Finland are accelerating collaboration with 
NATO and openly discussing membership. 
The Norwegian military is reprioritising 
national defence, and held its largest ma-
noeuvre in almost fifty years on its border 
to Russia at the beginning of 2015. In May 
and June major NATO exercises were held 
in the Baltic Sea and Arctic respectively 
(Baltops 2015 and Arctic Challenge). 
Russia, in turn, perceives these develop-
ments and NATO activities as provocations 
and threats to which it must respond. It is 
therefore crucial for the states involved to 
discuss military activities in both regions. 
However, they lack regional institutions or 
mechanisms for dealing with security ques-
tions. Without confidence-building mea-
sures there is a threat of misperceptions 
and miscalculations leading to unintention-
al escalation with unpredictable conse-
quences. There is a great danger not only of 
lasting harm to the Baltic Sea institutions 
and the Arctic Council, but of the respective 
regional orders coming undone. 
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Possible Development Paths 
Currently two development paths appear 
plausible. In the first, regional cooperation 
with Russia continues primarily on the 
functional and technical level, while politi-
cal dialogue remains very restricted or non-
existent. The second development path 
would involve an absolutely realistic escala-
tion, in the course of which all cooperation 
with Russia would become impossible. 
In order to prevent the latter, the re-
gional actors must explore how and where 
cooperation can be maintained or even 
intensified to mutual benefit. Ongoing 
shared interests can help to define suitable 
areas of cooperation. To this end it would 
be helpful to draw up a “positive list” of 
regional topics that could be detached from 
acute problems in relations and broader 
political interests. At stake here are con-
crete regional challenges that cannot be 
resolved and opportunities that cannot be 
grasped unless all the states in the region 
cooperate constructively and trustingly. In 
the Arctic these include search and rescue, 
polar research and sustainable economic 
development. In the Baltic Sea region, en-
vironment, infrastructure, soft security 
(smuggling and human trafficking), and 
civil society contacts remain important 
topics for cooperation. Russia has a strong 
interest of its own in continuing coopera-
tion in these areas, because it benefits if 
the shared challenges are tackled, and Rus-
sian representatives generally continue to 
participate constructively in the technical 
organs. In this way islands of cooperation 
could be created or consolidated. But in 
case of doubt the existence of these islands 
will not prevent military action. 
The question therefore arises whether 
regional security topics should not be added 
to the cooperation agenda. But given that 
the current crisis is characterised by dis-
agreements, the time is not ripe. The exist-
ing formats are not designed for security 
questions and would be overstretched by 
additional tasks. 
It would therefore be more promising to 
seek an understanding on dealing with 
crises in the scope of the NATO-Russia 
Council, which is the obvious central organ 
for NATO member states and Russia to dis-
cuss security questions. In the longer term 
autonomous formats that build trust by 
providing mechanisms for consultation 
over military activities should be developed 
for both regions. Altogether more commu-
nication, information exchange, predicta-
bility and transparency are needed. 
However, the chances for greater co-
operation and less militarisation in both 
regions must be assessed realistically: At 
the moment they are rather small. 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, 2015 
All rights reserved 
These Comments reflect  
solely the authors’ views. 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute for 
International and  
Security Affairs 
Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 
10719 Berlin 
Telephone  +49 30 880 07-0 
Fax  +49 30 880 07-100 
www.swp-berlin.org 
swp@swp-berlin.org 
ISSN 1861-1761 
Translation by Meredith Dale 
(English version of 
SWP-Aktuell 74/2015) 
